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Introduction 
Who speaks for Europe is one of the major questions in European integration. Prior to the 
Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the European Union (EU) had two collective spokespersons for 
foreign policy: the rotating Presidency and the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). Yet, as is often the case with too many cooks in the kitchen, 
there was a considerable lack of clarity about the division of their labour. The Treaty 
provisions were limited, effectively leaving it to them to decide who did what. Since the 
Presidency rotated every six months, their relationship was continuously re-negotiated. The 
academic interest in the relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative is 
long-standing (e.g. Allen 1998; Bengtsson 2003; Crowe 2003), but few systematic attempts 
have been made to study in which cases the Presidency or the High Representative spoke for 
the EU. 
 
This article analyses external representation in instances of conflict resolution where the EU 
played a significant role. Conflict resolution is defined by the European Commission as 
“actions undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict” (Duke and Ojanen 2006: 484) 
and is the most salient form of external representation. This article argues that the size of the 
Presidency mattered for its relations with the High Representative. Firstly, large member 
states have generally more political expertise and diplomatic resources. They are thus more 
capable of dealing with conflict resolution and are less risk averse than small member states, 
which may prefer to delegate tasks. Secondly, it was easier for the High Representative to 
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compete with small member states for media attention and audiences with third parties than 
with large member states. This article provides empirical evidence by comparing two most-
similar cases of external representation during the wars between Israel and Lebanon (2006) 
and between Russia and Georgia (2008). In the first instance, under the Finnish Presidency, 
the High Representative was the key EU-level actor, while in the second instance the French 
Presidency spoke for Europe. Many other possible explanatory variables in the relationship 
between the Presidency and High Representative (e.g. salience, duration of the conflict, EU 
divisiveness and institutional rules) are excluded in the most-similar systems design.  
 
These findings are relevant in at least three ways. Firstly, while various scholars have argued 
that smaller Presidencies tend to delegate more tasks (particularly to the Council Secretariat), 
they have all pointed to the lack of administrative capacity. Such conclusions can be extended 
to political expertise. Secondly, there is a common belief that the rotating Presidency 
particularly benefited the small member states, as it allowed them to punch above their weight 
in world affairs and it gave their national leaders plenty of photo opportunities that they 
otherwise would not have. Small member states, it was also argued, did not have enough 
weight to handle the responsibilities of the office. The large member states therefore 
convinced the European Convention (2003-2004) to abolish the rotating Presidency in favour 
of permanent structures. Yet this article shows the contrary: the French Presidency used its 
turn at the wheel for domestic exposure and the Finnish Presidency refrained from using its 
position for symbolic benefits. Thirdly, the case study on the Israeli-Lebanese war reveals that 
High Representative had significant discretion, despite an understanding in the literature that 
the High Representative assisted the Presidency. 
 
This article starts with a discussion of the relationship between the Presidency and the High 
Representative from a theoretical perspective and explains the case selection process. It 
subsequently studies EU collective external representation during the Israeli-Lebanese and 
Russian-Georgian wars. While there were, of course, multiple European actors (including 
national leaders) active during these conflicts, this article is interested in the most visible EU-
level actor – the Presidency or the High Representative.
1 This is the dichotomous dependent 
variable. Speaking for the EU is, in this respect, not defined in formal institutional terms. It is 
not about whether the Presidency or the High Representative was given an explicit mandate 
by the member states to represent the Union in a specific instance of conflict resolution. 
Instead, it is about whether the Presidency or the High Representative was, in practice, the 
most visible EU-level actor in an instance of conflict resolution.  
1.  Explaining who speaks for the EU 
Europe has a plethora of external representatives. Among those that claim to speak for Europe 
are national leaders and their foreign ministers, the European Commissioner for External 
Relations and the Commission President, the six-monthly rotating Presidency and the High 
Representative. Only the latter two, however, formally represented the EU in matters of 
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foreign policy prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. There are different ways to conceptualise the 
relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative. The most obvious is 
through the lenses of the classical principal-agent model (Pollack 1997, 2003; Hawkins et al. 
2006; Tallberg 2006). Article 18(1) of the Treaty on the European Union, after all, stipulated 
that “the Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign 
and security policy”, while article 18(3) stated that the Presidency “shall be assisted by the ... 
High Representative for the common foreign and security policy”. This suggests a clear 
asymmetrical power relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative: the 
High Representative was an ‘assistant’ that did on a daily basis what the Presidency asked 
him/her to do. It can thus be logically inferred that the Presidency only delegated the task of 
representation in a particular instance of conflict resolution, if the benefits of delegation for 
the Presidency outweighed the costs. 
 
Bureaucratic politics provides another way of looking at the Presidency/High Representative 
relations (Downs 1967; Allison 1971; Halperin 1974; Peters 1992; Christiansen 1997). This 
perspective suggests that when two or more actors occupy the same functional territory, they 
may compete for scarce resources, influence and visibility. Bureaucratic politics does not 
necessarily put all actors on par, but this theoretical argument does move beyond the power 
asymmetries of the Treaties. The High Representative is no longer seen as the agent of the 
Presidency and his/her actions no longer require a fiat. While it may seem counterintuitive to 
ignore the formal rules, Solana sometimes acted exactly this way. In an interview, he once 
stated that “I do whatever I want ... I pursue my own agenda. I don’t have to check everything 
with everyone ... if you ask for permission, you would never do anything” (FT 2003).
2 The 
Presidency and the High Representative, from this perspective, were thus in a game of 
political competition to represent the EU. Needless to say, both models are extremes and 
reality is, as usual, positioned somewhere in the middle. Yet, for analytical purposes, it is 
useful to consider both extreme models. 
1.1.  The size of the rotating Presidency 
Regardless of whether the relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative is 
best described by the principal-agent model or bureaucratic politics, the size of the rotating 
Presidency matters when analysing who spoke for the EU.
3 In the first model, the principal 
(the Presidency) only delegates the task of representing the EU in an instance of conflict 
resolution to its agent (the High Representative), if the benefits of delegation outweigh the 
costs. The initial observation is that such cases are rare. Being the external spokesperson of 
the EU generally paid off for the rotating Presidency. The benefits of external representation 
were twofold: firstly, it often led to significant media exposure, which was beneficial for 
national politicians. The six-monthly period in the chair gave them an aura of statesmanship 
(at least in the eyes of the domestic public). Secondly, external representation created 
opportunities for private gain. In its meetings with third parties, the Presidency often became 
party to privileged information, which it could use in the discussions with the other member 
states to shape outcomes to its own advantage (Tallberg 2006).  
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If external representation yields such advantages, why delegate? The answer is that the 
Presidency was naturally risk-averse and afraid of failures, which might have serious negative 
consequences for its reputation. While this counted, in principle, for all Presidencies, it was 
particularly the smaller member states that were wary of bold action on the international scene 
resulting from their lack of political and diplomatic expertise. Pre-cooked agreements that 
only needed to be sealed during a meeting with a head of government from a third country 
were excellent for the rotating Presidency. When there was actual uncertainty about the 
outcomes of a process and a need for the involvement of political actors in salient mediation 
efforts, national politicians of smaller member states with limited expertise might have 
preferred to delegate these tasks to the High Representative. This was not only to shift the 
potential blame, the High Representative was himself highly experienced and had a dedicated 
staff. 
 
The argument that the Presidency delegated tasks, because of a lack of political expertise, fits 
in with the more extensive literature on the day-to-day relations between the Presidency and 
the Council Secretariat, the supporting bureaucracy of the High Representative. Most scholars 
have made the observation that smaller member states tend to rely more during their 
Presidency on the Council Secretariat than the larger member states (e.g. Christiansen 2002; 
Elgström 2003a; Nugent 2006; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008). While this may have to 
do with better coordination mechanisms or preparation in the smaller administrations, the 
main reason is that they simply have too little administrative capacity to perform all the tasks 
of the Presidency. Obviously, there is a difference between the less glamorous bureaucratic 
work of drafting agendas and the political tasks of representation of the EU in international 
conflicts, but the general argument still holds: the Presidency could use the High 
Representative and the Council Secretariat following the Treaties and it delegated to them 
tasks with (possible) negative payoffs. 
 
In the bureaucratic politics model, where the High Representative is an actor in his own right, 
the relative size of the rotating Presidency to the High Representative also clearly matters. 
The High Representative had little difficulty to compete with the foreign minister, or even the 
prime minister, from for example Slovenia for media attention. National politicians from 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the seat of the Presidency, on the other hand, 
were difficult to ignore. It is, in this respect, necessary to identify the resources of the High 
Representative vis-à-vis the Presidency. In the case of Solana, these were multiple. Firstly, his 
political expertise as a mediator in conflict resolution was unrivalled. Since 1992, he had been 
an actor on the international scene as Spanish foreign minister, the Secretary-General of 
NATO and the High Representative. Secondly, while member states may have been hesitant 
to support Solana, he was often recognized as the 'EU foreign policy chief' by third parties. 
Many countries preferred to talk to him and not to an unknown foreign minister that would be 
gone in several months (Crowe 2003). His network, reputation and continuity were thus in his 
favour. Thirdly, Solana developed a dedicated foreign policy staff, whose resources he could 
allocate rather freely to topics he deemed important (Dijkstra 2008, 2010). Fourthly, Solana 
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and the civil servants in the Council Secretariat had a worldly outlook and experience. Most 
national foreign ministries tend to have a more limited scope. Finally, and this is an advantage 
of the Presidency, the formal protocol did not favour the High Representative. Aside from the 
last point, Javier Solana thus had significant resources compared to many Presidencies. Many 
of these were, needless to say, related to his person and not to his function. For the model of 
bureaucratic politics, the occupant of the post of High Representative is thus important (see 
also conclusion). 
 
Table 1.  The relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative: size of 
the Presidency 
Side of the continuum  Treaty-based Beyond  the  Treaties 
Sort of relationship  Hierarchy of power  Non-hierarchical relations 
Formal model  Principal-agent model  Bureaucratic politics 
Explanation 
Cost-benefits for the Presidency: 
Delegation due to risk avoidance 
The strongest actor represents the 
EU 
Expected variance 
Size: small Presidencies have less 
political expertise 
Size: small Presidencies have less 
political resources 
 
1.2.    Case Selection: Most-similar design 
While the size of the rotating Presidency is thus an important explanatory variable, it is 
clearly not the only one. For example, it seems likely that the Presidency stayed on top of the 
(domestic) salient dossiers with photo opportunities and that it left the preparatory work to the 
High Representative. It is furthermore likely that the High Representative had an advantage 
over the Presidency in longer conflicts, which spread over the terms of various Presidencies. 
The High Representative was then already informed, had a track record and was known by the 
third parties leading to path dependency (see e.g. Pierson 2004). The internal divisiveness 
within the EU also seemed to matter. If the member states agreed on a foreign policy dossier, 
there was less risk for the Presidency to get involved. If diplomatic and political manoeuvring 
was necessary within the EU, it may have wanted to leave such delicate tasks to the High 
Representative. Finally, it hardly needs to be mentioned that it mattered whether the 
relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative plays under the Nice Treaty 
or different formal rules (e.g. Lisbon Treaty). 
 
With various explanations for when the High Representative or the Presidency spoke for the 
EU, it can be difficult to draw conclusions from a comparative case study analysis. Yet rather 
than opting for a large-n quantitative study – which has the drawback of not giving enough 
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context and thus negatively affecting the internal validity – this article uses a most-similar 
systems design, which strategically excludes other explanations (Lijphart 1971). In such 
design, Seawright and Gerring (2008: 304, original emphasis) note, “the chosen pair of cases 
is similar on all the measured independent variables, except the independent variable of 
interest”. If the independent variable of interest (x1) and the dependent variable (y) differ in 
both cases, it can be concluded that the independent variable of interest is likely of relevance 
when explaining the outcome. The explicit qualification is in place as few events in social 
science can be explained by one variable (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) and international 
relations does not allow for laboratory settings that completely control for all possible 
differences between cases (see also conclusion). Moreover, it by no means implies that other 
variables are not relevant. In order to determine their importance, further research is required.  
 
The variable of interest in this article is the size of the Presidency. It is therefore necessary to 
select two cases with roughly the same salience level, duration, EU divisiveness, and 
institutional rules that took place under different Presidencies and had different outcomes in 
terms of representation. EU external representation during the Israeli-Lebanese war (2006) 
and the South Ossetia war (2008) fit these criteria. Both instances were very salient with 
substantial media coverage. Both took place during one Presidency and were short. With 
regard to the situation in the Middle-East and Russia, the EU member states were internally 
divided and both conflicts took place under the Nice Treaty. The difference was that in the 
first conflict Finland held the rotating Presidency, while during the second case it was France. 
The outcomes also differed: during the Lebanon war, the High Representative was the most 
visible EU-level actor, while in the South Ossetia war it was the French Presidency.  
 
Table 2.  Overview of independent and dependent variables in a most-similar case selection 
Case study  Israeli-Lebanese war (2006)  South Ossetia war (2008) 
x1 EU presidency  Small country: Finland  Large country: France 
x2 Salience  Very high  Very high 
x3 Duration  Short Short 
x4 EU divisiveness  Very high  Very high 
x5 Institutional rules  Nice Treaty  Nice Treaty 
y Most visible EU-level actor  High Representative  Rotating Presidency 
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2.  The Israeli-Lebanese War (2006) 
The Israeli-Lebanese War was triggered when Hezbollah took two Israeli soldiers hostage and 
killed eight (12 July).
4 Israel reacted the next day with military action by bombing Beirut 
International Airport and by blocking access to its port. The reaction of the international 
community was as immediate as it was predictable: the French called Israel’s actions 
“disproportionate” (Douste-Blazy 2008), the British stated that “Israel has every right to 
respond to inexcusable acts of provocation [but] it should do so in a way which does not 
escalate the situation” (Beckett and Solana 2008), and the United States vetoed a United 
Nations (UN) Security Council draft resolution calling for a cease fire. With the major powers 
digging trenches, there was a clear demand for mediation. The UN Secretary-General and the 
EU High Representative were particularly active in this respect. A spokesperson, for example, 
commented on Annan, “he really is on the phone personally ... with all players in the region” 
(UN News 2006). Solana himself stated that he had “spent practically all the night on the 
telephone with several important actors” (Beckett and Solana 2008; interview 2008).  
 
The phone calls led Annan to send a team to the Middle-East under the leadership of his 
political advisor Vijay Nambiar (UN News 2006). While this mission was initially supported 
by the EU, Solana felt that given the deteriorating situation it was not enough. The United 
States furthermore continued to block progress in New York, which undermined the United 
Nations’ mandate. Solana thus gathered his advisors on 14 July and decided to travel to Beirut 
himself (interview 2006). Two days later, he met with the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora, 
whom he knew well personally. During the press conference Solana was asked what the 
purpose of his trip was and whether he would play a role in mediation. He ducked the 
question by answering “I am not going to tell you about any potential way of solving what 
you have mentioned. My visit today here is a visit of friendship, of solidarity and support” 
(Solana 2006a). Solana nonetheless importantly added that he was “the first person to arrive 
[in Lebanon] in the name of the International Community and which comes to show you our 
commitment” (ibid.). Solana did not have a formal mandate for his trip, but he was the first 
familiar face to visit the region. 
 
Solana’s role as a potential key actor in the conflict was strengthened by the fact that a regular 
meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) was scheduled for 
17 July. Although Solana went to Lebanon to show his friendship with the Lebanese people, 
he was now briefing the foreign ministers on the situation on the ground. As a result of 
enduring divisiveness within the EU, the ministers only came to agree on an ambiguous 
statement. They recognized Israel's right to self-defence, while at the same time urging utmost 
restraint and noting that “it is urgent to stop violence and return to diplomacy [as] only a 
political process of negotiation can bring lasting peace to the region” (GAERC 2006a). The 
member states furthermore expressed their “full support for the High Representative's active 
engagement” (ibid.). 
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So far the Finnish Presidency had been relatively absent. While on 13 July it had issued a 
short statement stating that it was greatly concerned about the “disproportionate use of force 
by Israel” and urging “Hezbollah to release the captured Israeli soldiers” (Presidency 2006a), 
it left the initiative to others.
  Finland was also constrained by its limited diplomatic 
capabilities. It did not, for example, have an ambassador in Lebanon. While the German 
ambassador acted on its behalf (EU 2006a), the situation made it difficult for Finland to 
directly talk to the Lebanese government. The Finnish reflex was therefore to rely on the 
actions of the United Nations. On 18 July, the Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja met with 
the UN Secretary-General. The resulting press release clearly showed the Finnish preference 
for the work of the Secretary-General over the EU High Representative: “We give our full 
support to the efforts of Secretary General Kofi Annan ... to calm the situation and return to 
the peace process ... also EU's High Representative Javier Solana visited the region recently” 
(Presidency 2006b). Whether Finland was reluctant to support the High Representative due to 
the EU's internal divisiveness or whether it had its own problems with Solana, this statement 
was somewhat odd. 
  
Whatever the support of Finland, Solana flew again to the region for a three-day visit (18-21 
July) following the GAERC meeting. During this trip he met with various actors (EU 2006a). 
He was also less ambiguous than a couple of days earlier during his visit to Lebanon. At a 
joint press point with the Israeli Foreign Minister, he stated that he had “the aim of trying to 
cooperate to see if the situation in the Middle East today can be stopped” (Solana 2006b). 
Solana’s position was, in this respect, also strengthened by a letter of the French President 
Chirac to the Finnish Presidency calling for a leading role of Solana in brokering a ceasefire 
on behalf of the EU (20 July; interview 2008). The Presidency ignored the letter by replying, 
only on 25 July, that it “fully supports the work of the High Representative, Javier Solana, 
who is acting on the EU’s behalf” (Presidency 2006c). While a French diplomat in the 
EUObserver (2006a, b) ironically noted that Solana now at least had a mandate to go to the 
region, the United Kingdom was reportedly unwilling to make Solana the formal EU 
representative given the lack of consensus within the EU on how to handle this crisis. France 
got the message and started to take the initiative in its own hands (see below). 
  
Shortly after Solana’s trip, the situation escalated when Israeli ground troops entered Lebanon 
following continuous rocket attacks by Hezbollah (22 July). At the same time Israel made it 
clear that it could accept a NATO-led multinational force guarding the border with Lebanon 
and with a mandate to disarm Hezbollah (23 July). This suggestion took many at NATO 
headquarters by surprise – they had expected an increased role for the United Nations instead 
– but it was welcomed by the United States. Its UN ambassador, however, made clear 
immediately that US troops were unlikely to get involved (IHT 2006a). France and Germany 
on the other hand, whose foreign ministers were visiting the region, expressed their reluctance 
to a NATO mission (ibid.). At the same time, United States Secretary Condoleezza Rice 
travelled to the Middle-East for the first time since the start of the conflict with stops in 
Beirut, Jerusalem and Ramallah (24-25 July). While this raised the prospects of a changing 
American position, Rice warned in advance of her trip that there were “no quick fixes” and 
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that the United States would still not support an early ceasefire (FT 2006a). She did become 
seriously involved in mediation (Hamel and Issacharoff 2008). 
  
The first multilateral conference on the Israeli-Lebanese war took place in Rome (26 July) 
with representatives of many of the involved countries and international organisations. The 
EU was represented by the Troika consisting of the Finnish Foreign Minister, the High 
Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. While this conference was more 
successful in dealing with the humanitarian situation in Lebanon, possible ways out of the 
conflict were also discussed. Solana, for example, made clear that the EU member states 
would have to make up the bulk of a possible international peacekeeping force, whether it is 
under UN flag or a UN-mandated EU mission (FT 2006b). President Chirac similarly stressed 
the European role, by pointing out that “NATO is perceived, whether we like it or not, as the 
armed wing of the West in these regions and consequently in terms of its image, NATO is not 
the right organization here” (NYT 2006a). Yet any discussion on a peace force was premature 
given the American reluctance to accept “temporary solutions”, such as an immediate cease-
fire (FT 2006c). The conference could only agree on an ambiguous “determination to work 
immediately to reach with the utmost urgency a cease-fire that puts an end to the current 
violence and hostilities” (co-chairmen statement 2006). 
  
After the conference, the Finnish Presidency and the Commissioner for External Relations 
also went on a joint trip to the Middle-East (27/28 July) with one diplomat noting that “clearly 
the presidency wants to be involved as well” (EUObserver 2006a). Yet the belated visit 
brought little new progress with Lebanese and Israeli diplomats allegedly grumbling about 
“having to host a plethora of EU entities” (EUObserver 2006b). Prime Minister Siniora 
furthermore initiated a modest seven point peace plan (27 July), which accepted an increased 
UN presence on Lebanese soil. This plan was quickly endorsed by all the major actors, except 
Israel and the United States. After the conference, however, the situation on the ground 
started to change. Based on the conference conclusions, Israel stated that it now had the 
“green light” to continue its attacks on Lebanon, which went down badly with the EU 
member states (IHT 2006b). In addition, Israel made two strategic mistakes by attacking a UN 
observer post and killing four people (27 July) and by bombing an apartment block in Qana 
during an air strike killing tens of Lebanese civilians (30 July). The United States pressed 
Israel to accept a 48-hours suspension of air raids (NYT 2006b). Rice furthermore instructed 
the US Representative to the United Nations to get a Security Council resolution (Harel and 
Issacharoff 2008). President Chirac sent directly his foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy to 
the region for the purpose of mediation (30 July) (NYT 2006c). These American and French 
initiatives eventually led to their jointly brokered peace agreement (see also below). 
  
On 1 August, the EU member states met in an extraordinary General Affairs and External 
Relations Council to discuss the situation in Lebanon. While they asked the High 
Representative “to remain engaged and to remain in contact with all the relevant parties” 
(GAERC 2006b), the initiative was now clearly with France and the United States. Within the 
UN Security Council there were two opposing views. The perspective championed by France 
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was that a cease-fire was necessary before any (French) peacekeeping troops could be 
deployed under a stronger UN mandate. The United States' argument, on the other hand, was 
that it only makes sense to agree to a complete deal and that 15,000-20,000 peacekeepers 
should arrive before a cease-fire could be agreed, because a cease-fire alone was unlikely to 
hold. The extra time, which it would take to arrange such matters, also gave Israel the 
opportunity to ‘finish business’ and claim victory (NYT 2006d). The United States eventually 
gave in, following the Qana bombing, and a draft Security Council resolution was tabled by 
France and the United States on 5 August. 
  
The text of this resolution (in Makdisi et al. 2009) called for a truce and suggested a second 
resolution in two or three weeks time, which would establish a final cease-fire and a political 
settlement. The monitoring of the truce would be in the hands of the current 2,000-strong UN 
mission in Lebanon. The draft resolution did not include a prisoner exchange nor did it 
require Israel to withdraw its troops from Lebanon (NYT 2006e). Moreover, the draft 
Security Council resolution expressed the intention to authorize a Chapter VII peacekeeping 
mission with robust enforcement powers. This was a problem for Lebanon, which criticized, 
opposed and finally rejected the draft resolution (FT 2006d; Picard 2006). However, as a 
counter offer, the Lebanese government suggested that it would deploy 15,000 of its own 
troops to Southern Lebanon to cover the period between Israeli withdrawal and the arrival of 
UN reinforcements (7 August) (NYT 2006f).
 This offer was initially dismissed by Israel, but 
Prime Minister Olmert quickly called it an “interesting step”, after France, but also the United 
States, stated that it was an “important contribution” (IHT 2006c). Despite some continuous 
negotiations at the United Nations, this idea eventually became the basis of Security Council 
Resolution 1701, which finally ended hostilities (11 August). 
  
Directly after the deal was agreed, Solana flew to the Middle-East in order to ensure the 
support of the regional parties for the resolution and to guarantee them that the international 
community would deploy a peacekeeping force “very, very quickly” (FT 2006e). Solana 
furthermore played an important role in making sure that the EU member states indeed 
delivered a substantial number of troops to the UNIFIL peacekeeping operation. This was 
essential, as France initially declined to play a major role in the mission by making only 200 
soldiers available. Given its leadership role during the negotiations, this was seen as a major 
setback for the United Nations (IHT 2006d).
5 Germany and the United Kingdom furthermore 
conveniently used their historical and Iraq/Afghanistan cards to avoid getting involved. Italy 
in the end stepped in with 3,000 troops and the willingness to take on the role of command. 
This was followed by contributions of other member states. Important, in this respect, was the 
political pressure of Solana and Annan during a second extraordinary GAERC (25 August). 
  
In the case of Lebanon, Solana was thus not the most important European actor; that role goes 
to France (see further Picard 2006). Yet when it came to collective representation, it was 
Solana rather than the Finnish Presidency, who spoke for the EU. Their relationship was not 
harmonious. The Finnish Presidency, after all, declined an increased mandate for the High 
Representative. The fact that Solana did not have the full backing of the Presidency and the 
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member states probably undermined his ability to really play the role of mediator. That 
having been said, Solana was particularly present. He knew the regional players involved and 
they accepted him as the EU voice. He was also the first politician of the international 
community to visit the region. This gave him the possibility to brief the EU foreign ministers. 
The Finnish Presidency lacked the political and diplomatic expertise to play a significant role 
in representation. It did not have diplomatic stature, neither on the ground nor in New York. It 
did not have the networks and contacts and was somewhat overwhelmed by the events. 
Moreover, it resented Solana taking on a major role. 
3.  The South Ossetia War (2008) 
The war between Georgia and Russia was not a complete surprise.
6 South Ossetia had been 
one of the frozen conflicts since the fall of the Soviet Union and Georgia's bilateral 
relationship with Russia had become notoriously difficult after Saakashvili replaced 
Shevardnadze as president during the Rose Revolution (2003). Georgia was, against Russian 
preferences, on its way to NATO membership and the United States together with many EU 
member states had recognized the unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo. Such 
independence, Russia had long argued, would set a precedent for other regions, including 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the spring of 2008 the situation went from bad to worse, with 
small conflicts taking place in both breakaway regions and Russia increasing the number of 
its peacekeepers in both regions to protect the local population against possible Georgian 
aggression (interview 2009). NATO furthermore held joint exercises with Georgian troops 
and the Russian army trained just across the northern border. In the beginning of August 
clashes between the Georgian army and the separatists intensified and, on 7 August, the 
Georgian army entered South Ossetia. 
  
The Russian response was immediate. It conducted airstrikes on Georgian targets and moved 
heavy military units – previously conveniently participating in the above-mentioned exercise 
– into South Ossetia to support its peacekeepers (8 August) (NYT 2008a). The national 
leaders from the United States and EU member states, most of who were being entertained by 
their Chinese host at the Beijing Olympics, called for an immediate cease-fire. The Russian 
Prime Minister Putin, however, stated that “war [had] started” (ibid.). The military might of 
Russia was no match for the Georgian troops, particularly after Russia opened a second front 
from Abkhazia (9 August). The Georgian army had no choice but to withdraw from South 
Ossetia (10 August) in order to defend what can be described Georgia proper, including its 
capital Tbilisi. This seemed to become the next Russian target (FT 2008a). Russia indeed 
continued its march south ignoring statements from the international community (NYT 
2008b). In a reaction to these military movements, the outgoing US President Bush made a 
surprisingly strong statement stating that “Russia has invaded a sovereign neighbouring state 
and threatens a democratic government elected by its people. Such an action is unacceptable 
in the 21st century” (11 August) (FT 2008b). 
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The EU’s message was, again due to its divisiveness, belated. While Poland and the Baltic 
states urged the European Council to meet in an emergency session, Germany and Italy stated 
that this would implicitly imply a condemnation of Russia, while it was Georgia that had 
started the war (FT 2008c). The French Presidency nonetheless took the initiative. After 
contacts with the two combatant parties as well as EU colleagues, it drafted a proposal, which 
included a cease-fire agreement and a re-establishment of the status quo before the conflict. A 
spokesperson of the French Presidency noted that its role was to “ensure the 27 members have 
the most unified position ... [and] to make the Russians understand that if the conflict 
continues there will be consequences”. Yet in reality, the Presidency turned the order the 
other way around (ibid.; Asmus 2010). On 12 August, President Sarkozy left for Moscow on 
his own to discuss a cease-fire proposal with Russian President Medvedev, while Foreign 
Minister Kouchner only gathered his counterparts on 13 August in an extraordinary General 
Affairs and External Relations Council – not to coordinate a position, but to brief them on the 
eventual Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement (ibid.). 
  
The success of President Sarkozy's trip was mixed. While the Russians did agree to his four 
points – no more use of force; cessation of hostilities; free access to humanitarian aid; and 
Georgian and Russian troops withdraw to their pre-war positions – they added two further. 
The sixth point was, in the short-term at least, rather uncontroversial calling for an 
international discussion on the long-term security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The fifth 
point would give Russia the right to keep peacekeeping forces in place (not specifying 
whether this included Georgia proper) until international monitors would arrive (NYT 2008c). 
The similarities with the Lebanese case were obvious – who fills the security vacuum until the 
deployment of the international presence – as were the sensitivities. After reaching agreement 
with Russia, Sarkozy travelled directly to Georgia to discuss the matters with President 
Saakashvili. Georgia was clearly not happy with the ambiguity in the fifth point and asked for 
a clear timeline. When Sarkozy tried to call the Russian President he was put on hold for 
nearly two hours, after which the Russians simply rejected the offer. This left the Georgians 
with a take-or-leave-it and Sarkozy allegedly put pressure on the Georgians by stating that 
“their tanks are 40 kilometers from Tbilisi. This is where we are” (ibid.). The Georgian 
President agreed at 2 a.m. to the six point action plan. 
  
The problems with the peace plan became directly apparent when Russian army continued to 
advance, looted the country-side and its tanks took up strategic positions around the Georgian 
city Gori (13 August). Russia claimed this was justified under point five (NYT 2008d). These 
developments re-emphasized the need for a quick presence of the international community on 
the ground. After having listened to a briefing of the French Presidency on the details of the 
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement, it is thus no surprise that the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council discussed various arrangements to monitor the cease-fire agreement (13 
August). This included, first and foremost, a strengthening of the existing OSCE monitor 
mission. Yet, following pressure from the French Presidency, the Council stated that it 
“considers that the European Union must be prepared to commit itself, including on the 
ground, to support every effort ... with a view to a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict 
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in Georgia” (GAERC 2008; NYT 2008e). The High Representative was tasked to investigate 
the options and to report back to the ministers during their next Council meeting in 
September. 
  
In the days after the cease-fire agreement, it became increasingly clear that Russian troops 
were not withdrawing from Georgia proper. This again led to a storm of protest by Western 
leaders. Condoleezza Rice stated on 17 August that “the Russian president said several days 
ago Russian military operations would stop. They didn’t”. Sarkozy noted that Russia in its 
relationship with the EU would suffer “serious consequences”, if its compliance with the 
agreement was not “rapid and complete”. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel warned that 
“this process should not drag out for weeks” (NYT 2008f). And yet it did. The Russian army 
stayed where it was and continued to ignore comments by the international community. On 22 
August, Russia began to withdraw its troops from a few places, but it strengthened its buffer 
zones along the South Ossetia border within Georgia proper (FT 2008d). In response, 
President Sarkozy called for an emergency European Council to be held on 1 September (24 
August). This meeting would have two objectives: to put extra pressure on Russia and to 
discuss how the EU could contribute to a solution by making available European monitors 
(NYT 2008g). 
  
Before the European Heads of State and Government had the opportunity to meet, Russia 
recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (26 August). This surprise move 
was directly condemned by the United States and the EU, with the French foreign minister 
Kouchner noting that “sanctions are being considered, and many other means as well” (FT 
2008e; IHT 2008). While the recognition of the two breakaway regions brought the EU 
member states closer together, the basic underlying divisiveness was not gone. The European 
Council therefore did not decide upon any direct punitive actions against Russia. It did reach 
agreement on sending a fact-finding mission to the region as a first step towards a possible 
monitoring presence in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The 
European Council furthermore decided to send President Sarkozy, together with the 
Commission President and Solana, to Moscow in order to “to continue discussions [with 
Russia] with a view to the full application of the six-point agreement”. A little stick was 
attached to this Troika visit, because “until [Russian] troops have withdrawn to the positions 
held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement [between 
the EU and Russia] will be postponed” (European Council 2008, article 11). 
  
The fact that President Sarkozy was now accompanied by Barroso and Solana made sense in 
functional terms. The European Commission would, after all, play a major role in the 
negotiations of the Partnership Agreement and the office of Solana was already planning a 
possible EU-led monitoring mission. In a divided EU, it was also a control mechanism for 
some member states to avoid a situation that Sarkozy could again use for private gain. Yet the 
fact that a French President, and particularly the current office-holder, does not like to be put 
on par with the Commission President or even the High Representative became very clear 
during the joint visit (interview 2009). In Moscow, President Sarkozy had a personal meeting 
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with President Medvedev. Barroso and Solana were granted a seat in second row. During the 
subsequent press conference, there were only two microphones on stage. One for the Russian 
President and one awkwardly shared by Sarkozy and Barroso. Solana was not allowed on 
stage and had to take a seat in the area designated for journalists. When the EU trio continued 
their trip to Tbilisi, Barroso did get a microphone himself on the platform with Sarkozy and 
Saakashvili, but Solana again had to sit with the journalists. 
  
Despite these problems with protocol, the Troika, under the leadership of President Sarkozy, 
nonetheless reached an agreement with Russia about the partial withdrawal of Russian troops 
from Georgia. The Russian army would leave Georgia proper by mid-October, if the EU 
would provide 200 monitors by 1 October to start monitoring the cease-fire agreement in the 
buffer zones outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian presence in the two breakaway 
regions was not included in the agreement, as Russia had recognized them as independent 
states. It was not willing to undo this recognition (FT 2008f). Russia furthermore made clear 
that the EU would not be monitoring the situation within the two regions (NYT 2008h). By 
agreeing to such terms, the EU thus de facto accepted the new borders, something explicitly 
noted by the NATO Secretary-General and many American observers (FT 2008g; Asmus 
2010). 
  
During the South Ossetia war it was thus clearly the French Presidency who was publicly 
speaking for the EU. It is telling that between the outbreak of the war (7 August) and the 
European Council meeting (1 September), there is not a single mention of Solana in either the 
Financial Times or the International Herald Tribune. President Sarkozy, on the other hand, 
was all over the news. That Solana did not have visibility during the South Ossetia war does 
not imply that he did not play a role. According to insiders, he was constantly on the phone 
with the various relevant actors including Russia, Georgia, France, the United Nations, the 
United States and Germany (interview 2009). Still, Solana was unable to compete with the 
Presidency as he had done in the case of Lebanon in terms of visibility. The Presidency had 
the political and diplomatic resources to play a role in this conflict itself. It furthermore used 
the protocol (head of state over foreign minister) and the formal Treaty rules to keep the High 
Representative at bay. 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the size of the rotating Presidency mattered for its relationship 
with the High Representative. It has done so through two most-similar case studies about the 
EU's representation during the Israeli-Lebanese war (2006) and the South Ossetia war (2006). 
In the first case, it was the High Representative who spoke for the EU. Solana made an early 
move, which put him in an advantageous position during the remainder of the process, and he 
was recognized as the EU representative by third parties. The Finnish Presidency, on the 
contrary, initially took a wait-and-see approach. It felt uncomfortable with the situation and it 
did not have the political expertise to take a leading role. Instead it initially supported the 
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efforts of the UN Secretary-General. It was, however, unhappy with Solana taking the 
headlines. Yet when the Finnish Presidency eventually did visit the region, it was belated and 
the trip was unsuccessful. 
  
While Solana had room to manoeuvre under the Finnish Presidency, the French Presidency 
instead directed the South Ossetia conflict from the Elysée. President Sarkozy flew to 
Moscow and Tbilisi alone and ignored the High Representative. This made an impression 
within the EU and with third parties. When the Russian army stayed in Georgia proper, 
contrary to the terms of the agreement, Sarkozy called for an extraordinary European Council. 
He furthermore championed the idea of having EU monitors in the region. After the 
recognition of independence by Russia, the European Council sent Sarkozy on a second 
mission together with the Commission President and the High Representative; it turned out 
again a one-man show. Solana did not play visible role in this conflict. He could not compete 
with the French head of state. Sarkozy is furthermore a known figure unlike the Finnish 
foreign minister, and the French Presidency had the expertise to bring this conflict to an end.  
  
The two cases also provide empirical input for the two models discussed in the beginning of 
this article. There are elements of bureaucratic politics and the principal-agent model at work 
in both instances of conflict resolution. Solana had great difficulty to compete with the French 
Presidency. While it was easier to push the Finnish Presidency aside, their relations were not 
entirely cooperative. In terms of hierarchical relations, the Finnish Presidency refused to grant 
the High Representative an extensive mandate, which fits with the principal-agent model, and 
the French Presidency only allowed him to perform non-visible tasks behind the scenes. 
Although elements of both models are present in the two cases, it is also clear that they 
occupy different positions at the continuum between both models. The relations between the 
High Representative and the French Presidency were closer to the traditional principal-agent 
model, while under the Finnish Presidency such formal relations were less relevant. With the 
Finnish Presidency it was more a question of resources. The significant autonomy of Solana 
during the Israeli-Lebanese war is striking compared to his role envisaged by the Treaties.  
  
Some words on methodology are also in place. A most-similar systems design is a good 
method to test one explanation. In terms of generalization, however, most-similar studies 
work best with cases that are broadly representative of the population (Seawright and Gerring 
2008). It is in this respect that small-n studies are inevitably challenged on external validity. 
Few events in international relations are, after all, exactly alike. An important question, in this 
respect, is to what extent the chosen Presidencies are representative of small and large 
member states. Needless to say, none of Presidencies are exactly the same (Elgström 2003b 
and the annual reviews of the Journal of Common Market Studies). They have all different 
foreign policy traditions, roles and identities. That having been said, the limited diplomatic 
experience and resources, and the risk averse behaviour of the Finnish Presidency is not 
atypical for actions of small EU member states. Whether the French Presidency reflected 
EU-3 behaviour is more debatable. Germany and the United Kingdom would probably have 
handled the situation differently (see, for example, Gross 2009). It is, however, unlikely that 
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both would have extensively relied on Brussels. In relations with Moscow, Berlin prefers to 
ignore the EU. London generally does not even consider it. To provide, however, a more 
definite answer to such questions, additional evidence through further research is required. 
Cases that may confirm the argument presented in this article are the crises in Macedonia 
(2001) and Ukraine (2004), where the High Representative played a major role compared to 
the Belgian and Dutch Presidencies respectively. This also brings us to other explanatory 
variables. This article has recognized that there are other explanations apart from the size of 
the Presidency. Further research could test these alternative explanations as well.  
  
The institutional relationship between the rotating Presidency and the High Representative 
dominated the last decade with respect to external representation in the EU. With the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Presidency plays a less prominent role in foreign policy. To what extent are the 
findings of this article then still relevant for current affairs? There are at least three answers. 
Firstly, formal rules are less relevant in practice than on paper. There is already evidence that 
European Council President Herman van Rompuy is gradually building up a foreign policy 
profile, despite his limited formal foreign policy function. Secondly, EU actors have to take 
internal (bureaucratic) politics seriously. It seems that Lady Ashton has eschewed turf wars 
with other actors so far and this comes at her own peril. Thirdly, international networks and 
third party recognition are of pivotal importance for the external representative. Within the 
European External Action Service, diplomatic expertise is being built up, but it is not always 
clear whether the EU spends enough time on how its leaders are perceived abroad. Lady 
Ashton can learn something from Solana in this respect. 
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Endnotes 
1As this article is interested in visibility, it extensively makes use of newspaper articles and press statements as 
empirical sources. The author has also conducted a limited number of elite interviews, on the basis of anonymity, 
with officials closely involved in the mediation activities of the rotating Presidency and the High Representative 
to confirm some of the findings. As the total number of involved officials was rather small, no information is 
disclosed in the article on the affiliation of these interviewees. 
2The Financial Times, New York Times and International Herald Tribute are abbreviated as FT, NYT, IHT. 
3Population is used as an indicator for size. Within the EU, it closely correlates with GDP and diplomatic 
resources. 
4For a detailed description of the war, see Harel and Issacharoff (2008). For a background on the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978-date), see Skogmo (1989), Hillen (2000) and Makdisi et al. (2009). 
5France refused to act through the normal United Nations command and control procedures. It demanded instead 
to have officers from EU states in charge of the planning and the conduct of operations. It used its troop 
contribution as a bargaining chip until the UN bureaucracies finally gave in. An ad hoc Strategic Military Cell 
was established in New York and France increased its contribution (see Hatto 2009; Mattelaer 2009). 
6For a detailed description of the background and the war, see Allison (2008), Antonenko (2009), Cornell and 
Starr (2009) and Asmus (2010). 